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NOTES
HEREFORD v. HEREFORD: GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO A NON-MOVING
PARTY
I. INTRODUCTION
The summary judgment procedure under Rule 56, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to Rule 56, Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure, was intended to provide a method of
promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue of
any material fact.' The Montana Supreme Court has approved the
summary judgment procedure but only when the express provi-
sions of Rule 562 have been complied with in district court.3 Fur-
ther, the supreme court has held that, assuming compliance with
Rule 56, a motion for summary judgment should be denied if any
doubt remains as to the propriety of granting it.4
The recent decision of Hereford v. Hereford5 expands the
scope of Rule 56 and the power of courts to grant summary judg-
ments in Montana. The supreme court therein adopted the major-
ity rule of federal courts that summary judgment may be granted
to a non-moving party under certain conditions, which the court
found to be unsatisfied in Hereford.6 This note will discuss the
Hereford decision, the rationale of the rule adopted, and un-
1. Original Committee Note of 1937 to Rule 56, reprinted in 6 MooRE's FEDPALR
PRA C cE 56.01[21, at 56-14 (2d ed. 1976).
2. MoNT. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides in part-
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
3. See Scott v. Robson, - Mont. _ 597 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1979); Hansen v. Trans-
america Ins. Co., 175 Mont. 273, 276, 573 P.2d 663, 665 (1978); Engebretson v. Putnam, 174
Mont. 409, 412-13, 571 P.2d 368, 370 (1977); Anderson v. Applebury, 173 Mont. 411, 414-15,
567 P.2d 951, 953-54 (1977); Duncan v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 173 Mont. 382, 386, 567 P.2d 936,
938 (1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 172 Mont. 150, 154, 561 P.2d 917, 919 (1977); Dean v. First
Nat'l Bank of Great Falls, 152 Mont. 474, 483, 452 P.2d 402, 407 (1969).
4. Cheyenne Western Bank v. Young, - Mont. -, 587 P.2d 401, 404 (1978); Fulton
v. Clark, 167 Mont. 399, 403, 538 P.2d 1371, 1373 (1975); Kober v. Steward, 148 Mont. 117,
122, 417 P.2d 476, 479 (1966).
5. - Mont. -, 598 P.2d 600 (1979).
6. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 602.
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resolved issues related to its application in Montana.
II. HEREFORD V. HEREFORD
A. Facts
On July 28, 1977, Charles Hereford filed an action against his
ex-wife, Margaret, for an accounting and judgment for excess child
support payments. The Herefords' 1972 divorce decree ordered
him to make monthly payments to Margaret for the support of
their minor child.7 The decree also required that children's benefits
received by Margaret from Charles's social security allowance be
credited toward his support obligation. In his complaint Charles
alleged he had not been given full credit for benefits over a five
year period, resulting in an overpayment to Margaret.8
Margaret filed an answer admitting receipt of support pay-
ments and social security benefits without alleging the amounts re-
ceived. Interrogatories were filed and answered by both parties.
Charles then moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule
56(a),' based on the issue of excess support payments. Margaret
resisted the motion, pointing to areas of contested fact, but made
no cross-motion or request for summary judgment. The district
court, however, entered summary judgment for Margaret based on
four grounds, 10 none of which had been addressed by Charles in his
motion or at the subsequent hearing on the motion.
B. The Court's Opinion
Charles appealed the summary judgment entered against him
to the Montana Supreme Court. In an opinion by Justice Sheehy,
the court held that it was error for the district court to grant sum-
7. The divorce decree, entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, County of
Ravalli, ordered Charles to pay $100 per month until December 4, 1977 when James Here-
ford, the son of the parties, reached legal age. The total amount of child support due under
the divorce decree was $7,113.33.
8. Margaret allegedly received social security children's benefits totaling $5,558.10 and
support payments from Charles totaling $4,042.88. The alleged overpayment to Margaret
was $2,487.65.
9. MoNT. R. CIrv. P. 56(a) provides:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain
a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
10. The four stated grounds were as follows: Charles was guilty of laches; any overpay-
ments were voluntary; Margaret had made sacrifices to assure full visitation rights for
Charles; and Charles had a duty to support his son and all payments went for the support of
his son.
[Vol. 42
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mary judgment to Margaret, a non-moving party, on grounds other
than the issue addressed by Charles in his motion for summary
judgment or at the hearing on the motion, without first affording
him notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.1 The su-
preme court also found the summary judgment entered for Mar-
garet to be unsupported by the record on the four grounds relied
upon by the district court.12 The court refused to direct the district
court to enter summary judgment in favor of Charles, however,
holding that before it could do so, all the facts bearing on the
issues must be before the supreme court. 13 The order granting
summary judgment to Margaret was reversed and the cause was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion. 4
In deciding the basic procedural issue of whether the district
court properly granted summary judgment to the non-moving
party, the court stated:
By the great weight of authority, no formal cross-motion is neces-
sary for the court to enter summary judgment. The invocation of
the power of the court to render summary judgment in favor of
the moving party gives the court power to render summary judg-
ment for his adversary provided the case warrants that result.
However, the court must be very careful that the original movant
had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition, that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the other party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.'8
The court applied this statement of the majority federal rule
to the facts in Hereford and found the summary judgment entered
for Margaret failed to meet the rule's requirements. 6 First, the
case did not warrant the result of granting summary judgment to
Margaret; she was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
issues of material fact existed on each of the four grounds stated.' 7
Second, Charles was not afforded an opportunity to resist the sum-
mary judgment by showing that genuine issues of material fact
existed and that Margaret was not entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law.' 8
11. Hereford, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d at 602.
12. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 602-03.
13. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 603.
14. Id.
15. Id. at -, 598 P.2d at 602, citing 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 56.12, at 56-331
and 56-334 (2d ed. 1976).
16. Hereford, __ Mont. -, 598 P.2d at 602.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19811
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The supreme court also recognized in Hereford that it had the
power not only to reverse the summary judgment entered for Mar-
garet but also to direct the district court to enter summary judg-
ment in favor of Charles.19 The court applied another majority fed-
eral rule which requires all the facts bearing on the issues to be
before the appellate court before it may direct the trial court to
enter summary judgment in favor of a party.20 The supreme court
found the facts of this case were not clear enough to enter sum-
mary judgment for Charles and therefore remanded the case for
further proceedings in the district court.2
III. THE RATIONALE OF THE RULE
Rule 56 does not expressly allow granting summary judgment
to a non-moving party.22 An amendment to Rule 56(c) 2 . that would
have permitted such a result in a proper case was proposed by the
Advisory Committee in 1955 but never adopted.24 In addition, the
language of Rule 56(c) "5 can reasonably be construed to require a
motion as a prerequisite for granting summary judgment.2 6
Nevertheless, a substantial majority of federal courts constru-
ing Rule 56 have held that summary judgment may be granted to a
non-moving party where the case warrants, provided the opposing
party has been given notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard.2 7 There is some contra authority.2 In states incorporating
the federal rules into their own, a majority conform to the position
of the federal courts,'9 but a significant minority require that a
19. Id. at - 598 P.2d at 603.
20. Id., citing 6 MooRE's FEDRAL PRAcTicE 56.12, at 56-337 (2d ed. 1976).
21. Hereford, - Mont. -, 598 P.2d at 603.
22. See MoNT. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and MoNT. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
24. Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amend-
ments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (1955), re-
printed in 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTcE 56.01[8], at 56-17 (2d ed. 1976).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), which is identical to MoNr. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
26. See, e.g., Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Iowa 1977).
27. E.g., Morrissey v. Curran, 423 F.2d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
928 (1970); Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. National Milling Co., 409 F.2d 882, 884-85 (3d Cir.
1969); Betts v. Coltes, 467 F. Supp. 544, 546 (D. Hawaii 1979); Moss v. Ward, 450 F. Supp.
591, 594 (W.D. N.Y. 1978); Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. v. Zero, 381 F. Supp. 363, 367-68
(N.D. IM. 1974); affd, 525 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976); Peo-
ples Trust Co. v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (D. N.J. 1970), a/I'd, 444 F.2d 193
(3d Cir. 1971).
28. E.g., Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Missouri, 564 F.2d 236, 242 (8th Cir. 1977); Sharlitt v.
Gorinstein, 535 F.2d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 1976).
29. E.g., Trimmer v. Ludtke, 105 Ariz. 260, 263, 462 P.2d 809, 812 (1969); Markel v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 353, 358-59, 442 P.2d 97, 102 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 999 (1968); Flint v. MacKenzie, 53 Hawaii 672, 673, 501 P.2d 357, 358 (1972); Houk v.
4
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formal cross-motion be made before granting summary judgment
against the original movant.30
State and federal courts adopting the majority rule often cite,
in support of their position, the purpose of Rule 56: prompt dispo-
sition of actions where no material facts are disputed.3 1 They con-
tend there is no need for the mere mechanics of a cross-motion
when the power of the court to render summary judgment has
been properly invoked. 2 Potential prejudice to the original movant
is minimized, according to this view, by the requirements of notice
and an opportunity to be heard.88 Some decisions have also relied
on Rule 54(c)3 ' which grants a court power to enter final judgment
to which the prevailing party is entitled even if that party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings."
IV. APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN MONTANA
The Hereford decision departs from prior Montana case law
on summary judgments by approving a form of procedure beyond
the express provisions of Rule 56.6 The Hereford rule, permitting
courts to grant summary judgment to a non-moving party, also
poses questions and one apparent conflict on related procedural is-
sues, in view of prior decisions of the Montana Supreme Court.
The first of those related issues is whether summary judgment
may be granted upon an oral cross-motion made at the hearing
held on the original motion for summary judgment. The majority
position in the federal courts is that an oral cross-motion is suffi-
cient in a proper case.37 This view is essentially a corollary to the
majority rule adopted in Hereford because if summary judgment
may be granted without a cross-motion, a fortiori, it may be
Ross, 34 Ohio St.2d 77, 80-85, 296 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (1973); Thomas v. Transport Ins. Co.,
532 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. 1976); Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Utah 2d 194, 200,
443 P.2d 385, 389 (1968).
30. E.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Fish, 166 Cal. App. 2d 353, 333 P.2d 133, 137 (1958);
Estate of Campbell, 253 N.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Iowa 1977); Seire v. Police and Fire Pension
Comm'n, 4 N.J. Super. 230, 235, 66 A.2d 746, 748 (1949); Dixon v. Shirley, 531 S.W.2d 386,
387-88 (Tex. 1975).
31. Local 33, Int'l Hod Carriers v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d
Cir. 1961); Smith v. McDonald, 116 F. Supp. 158, 159-60 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Flint v. MacKen-
zie, 53 Hawaii 672, 673, 501 P.2d 357, 358 (1972).
32. E.g., Hennessey v. Federal Sec. Adm'r., 88 F. Supp. 664, 668 (D. Conn. 1949).
33. See, e.g., Houk v. Ross, 34 Ohio St. 2d 77, 80-85, 296 N.E.2d 266, 271-72 (1973).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
35. See, e.g., Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313, 318 (N.D. InI. 1946),
rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
36. See MowT. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
37. See Tripp v. May, 189 F.2d 198, 200 (7th Cir. 1951); Dyek v. Blair, 390 F. Supp.
1291, 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Baird v. Lynch, 390 F. Supp. 740, 746 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
19811
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granted upon an oral cross-motion provided the same conditions
are satisfied in both cases.
In Audit Services, Inc. v. Haugen,5 however, the Montana
Supreme Court stated in dictum that Rule 56 does not allow oral
motions for summary judgment. There, the appellee had filed a
written motion and supporting brief for summary judgment based
on one issue but argued for summary judgment at the subsequent
hearing on different grounds. The court held that under those cir-
cumstances, summary judgment may properly be granted on
grounds other than those stated in the motion and brief.39 Appel-
lants contended that summary judgment had been granted upon
an oral motion at the district court hearing. The supreme court
rejected that contention, but agreed that Rule 56 does not allow
oral motions for summary judgment.' 0
The court's statement in Haugen conflicts with the majority
rule adopted in Hereford requiring no formal cross-motion to grant
summary judgment. The resolution of the conflict most consistent
with the Hereford rule is that an oral motion cannot initially in-
voke the court's power to render summary judgment. Once that
power has been properly invoked by written motion of one party,
however, an oral cross-motion at the subsequent hearing is suffi-
cient to grant summary judgment to the opposing party.41 The
court's dictum in Haugen should therefore be limited to situations
where, unlike Haugen, no previous written motion has properly in-
voked the power of the court.
Another issue related to the Hereford rule is whether sum-
mary judgment may be granted to a non-moving party without
affording the moving party notice or further opportunity to be
heard, provided the summary judgment is based on the same
grounds addressed by the moving party in his own motion. It can
be argued that if the movant has alleged there is no dispute of
material fact on a specific issue, he could not subsequently argue
against summary judgment by asserting a dispute of material fact
exists on the same issue.42
38. - Mont. -, 591 P.2d 1105 (1979).
39. Id. at -, 591 P.2d at 1108.
40. Id.
41. The facts of Sequoia Union High Dist. v. United States, 245 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.
1957), the case cited as authority for the supreme court's dictum in Haugen, support this
resolution of the conflict. There, the court held that Rule 56 does not authorize oral motion
for summary judgment. The facts of the case can be distinguished from the facts in Haugen
or Hereford because no written motion had ever been filed by either party to properly in-
voke the court's power to render summary judgment.
42. See generally, Mourning v. Family Publication Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 362
(1973).
[Vol. 42
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This argument was rejected in Faith Lutheran Retirement
Home v. Veis.45 There, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not
establish the lack of a genuine issue of material fact." The court
relied on the principle that a party may concede there is no issue
of material fact based on his own legal theory but properly assert a
dispute of material fact if based on his opponent's legal theory.45
This principle, in a factual context similar to Hereford, requires
the court to afford the movant notice and further opportunity to
be heard before granting summary judgment to the non-movant
even though the summary judgment is based on grounds addressed
previously by the movant.
Finally, a procedural issue related to the Hereford rule arises
when one party files a Rule 12(b)(6)" motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, but matters
outside the pleadings are considered by the court. If this occurs,
Rule 12(b) 47 reqires the motion to be disposed of as one for sum-
mary judgment. The issue raised by Hereford is whether the non-
moving party could be granted summary judgment under those
circumstances.
In two prior Montana cases, 8 the court reversed summary
judgment granted to the moving party, where a motion to dismiss
had been treated as a motion for summary judgment, because the
opposing party was not afforded an opportunity to resist the mo-
tion as one for summary judgment. Those cases would not prevent
granting summary judgment to the non-moving party under the
rule adopted in Hereford, provided the rule's requirements of
notice and an opportunity to be heard for the moving party are
satisfied.
43. 156 Mont. 38, 473 P.2d 503 (1970).
44. Id. at 47, 473 P.2d at 507, citing 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1239, at 176-78 (Rules
ed. 1958).
45. Veis, 156 Mont. 47, 473 P.2d at 507.
46. MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
47. MONT. R. Civ. P. 12(b) provides in part:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and
all the parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all the material
made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.
48. Graveley v. Macleod, 175 Mont. 338, 344, 573 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1978); State ex rel.
Dept. of Health & Environmental Sciences v. City of Livingston, 169 Mont. 431, 435-36, 548
P.2d 155, 157-58 (1976).
1981]
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V. CONCLUSION
The majority federal rule adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court in Hereford allows granting summary judgment to a non-
moving party, and thereby expands the scope of Rule 56 beyond its
express provisions. The rule is within the express purpose of Rule
56, however, and is sound in principle and supported by substan-
tial authority. Several related procedural questions are raised by
the Hereford decision and the application of the new rule in light
of prior Montana case law. An apparent conflict exists on the issue
of granting summary judgment upon an oral cross-motion.
The questions posed and the conflict can be logically resolved
by relying on the rationale of the adopted rule. The Hereford rule
incorporates the essential ingredients of properly invoking the
power of the court to render summary judgment, satisfying the
substantive requirements of Rule 56, and providing the procedural
safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Potential
conflicts and inconsistent results in the future can be avoided by
adhering to the rule and its rationale.
Kenneth R. Dyrud
[Vol. 42
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 42 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/7
